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ABSTRACT
Work for this thesis focuses on managing complexity within complex adaptive
sociotechnical systems by using model based systems engineering and virtual engineering
tools. The hypothesis of the work is that integrated virtual models can be used to increase
the understanding of these complex adaptive sociotechnical systems, resulting in a
reduction in the perceived complexity. This was tested by the use of a two factor survey
given to experts of a system (the customer and members of the model design team) and to
a target user-group. This group received a demonstration and had hands on experience
with a preliminary model of the same system. Results of the survey show that new system
designers using an integrated virtual modeling tool view the system as less complex than
experts involved with designing the same system without using a tool. Further data is
required to support this conclusion, and a plan for gathering more data is described. The
application of this method to an emergency response system is then discussed to show
how it can be applied to other complex sociotechnical systems and guidelines for
applying this methodology are proposed.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a global trend evolving that involves looking at any situation from a
perspective of a system. A system is said to be a collection of parts that are interrelated
and join to serve some purpose. Some systems are defined as closed, which means they
have clear boundaries and operate in isolation from their environment. Most systems,
however, are open and have regular interaction with the world around them.
In what could be seen as a method of simplification, engineering has traditionally
focused on the behavior of the mechanical or technical components of a system with very
little regard for the human component. From an engineering perspective, human behavior
is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with the same degree of accuracy that result from
modeling technical systems. Humans do not often operate by the linear logic we can
attribute to technical and mechanical systems. Although the degree of accuracy may be
reduced, the same processes used to model traditional systems can be applied to modeling
organizations as sociotechnical systems, systems that combine humans and technology.
As George Box (1987) is known for saying, “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
A model is not required to be perfect for it to improve our understanding of the system.
The field of systems engineering strives to gain understanding of systems and
their interactions. Once a system is understood, it can be manipulated to make it more
efficient and effective. When a systems gets too large and interrelated to be easily
understood, the concept of complexity comes into play. Complexity refers to the nature
of an alteration to one component to trigger other unintended changes in a system. In
order to manage the system and understand all of the effects a single alteration might
have, the detailed relationships and points of integration need to be captured. While
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systems engineering offers multiple solutions to understanding complex systems, the
technique covered in this research is using model based systems engineering to create
virtual models.
Model based systems engineering (MBSE) is the use of models to capture the
components and flows within systems and systems of systems in order to increase
understanding of the function and integration of system attributes. These models can be
scaled down physical versions of systems or virtual models. Virtual models are
computer-based representations of the systems. This allows models to be used to run
scenarios of systems operations in a safe and secure manner without incurring the time,
resources, and expenses of running tests on the full-scale system.
While MBSE is most often used to study purely technical systems, the theory
explored here is that the same concepts and procedures can be used to reduce the
perception of complexity and improve the understanding of sociotechnical systems.
Tsutomu Shimomura (1996) is quoted as saying “We call things we don’t understand
‘complex’, but that means we haven’t found a good way of thinking about them.” The
efforts of this project are working towards finding a new “good” way of thinking of
sociotechnical complex adaptive systems.
Included herein is a thorough literature review of sociotechnical systems,
complexity and complex adaptive systems. Those are found in chapter two. Chapter three
is a summarization of the technique used to build a virtual model, including a discussion
of the two-factor survey technique for analyzing the level of complexity within a system.
The two-factor survey technique is proposed for use in the discovery phase of a project to
determine whether the level of complexity in the system justifies the outlay of resources
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required to build a virtual model. The first application, focused on the development of the
Virtual Forward Operating Base project for the United States Department of Defense,
comprises chapter four. This is where the hypothesis was tested and the results of the test
can be found. In a discussion about possible expansion of the work to another
sociotechnical complex adaptive system, an emergency response organization, is
proposed in the fourth section. Also discussed is the future work needed to validate
assumptions made for the purposes of the simplified two-factor model. Lessons learned
relevant to the two factor survey and general project management from the Virtual
Forward Operating Base project are then summarized for expansion of the methodology
to other sociotechnical complex adaptive systems, such as the emergency response
organization proposal.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW OF SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS THEORY,
COMPLEXITY, AND COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
The term sociotechnical systems originated in the 1960s. Walker, Stanton,

Salmon, & Jenkins (2008) established sociotechnical systems theory as being composed
of two principles of managing systems that involved both sociological (human) and
technical components. The first principle proposed that sociological and technical
elements combine to form attributes and relationships that either make or break the
system in terms of performance. These interactions include linear, predictable, planned
relationships, as well as relationships of a non-linear, complex, emergent nature. The
second principle is that both the sociological and technical systems need to be managed
simultaneously (Walker et al, 2008). If either component is optimized without respect to
the alternate subsystem, the system as a whole will not be optimized, and could in fact be
reduced in efficiency due to unintended effects to the alternate subsystem. For example, a
vehicle can be designed to mechanically transfer cargo from point A to point B, and the
efficiency of the vehicle can be optimized and the materials in the vehicle minimized to
reduce cost. However, if the design does not consider the human component, the driver,
the vehicle will never make it to market. Similarly, an organization can be optimized
through training and team building exercises, through practice in the area of
communications and task skills, but if the equipment needed to perform the task is illdesigned and malfunctions, the task will not be efficiently completed. Sociotechnical
theory provides a holistic approach to system management.
One of the more traditional applications of sociotechnical systems is in the arena
of work design. When attempting to manage a new technology as part of a task sequence,
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Cooper & Foster (1971) viewed the technological component of the sociotechnical theory
as part of the environment. As a result, Cooper & Foster proposed a standard notation and
framework for looking at processes within sociotechnical organizations and the
environment as a holistic system. Their framework consisted of a simplified flow chart,
with columns representing work accomplished by humans, work completed by machine,
and work performed upon different materials combined with arrows to provide a
sequence of actions. Cooper & Foster laid the foundation for traditional work design
applications of sociotechnical systems theory.
Building on the foundational work of Cooper & Foster (1971), Adler & Docherty
(1998) demonstrated an approach of sociotechnical systems (or sociotechnical business
systems as they termed it) to be an advantage for improving teamwork on product
development teams. The anonymous organization they studied used sociotechnical
business systems to organize and manage a multi-generational technical product design.
Not only did the anonymous organization focus on improving the technical product, but
by incorporating a mix of new designers and designers from the first generation design
into the second phase of design they were able to maintain the project and product
knowledge while adding new perspectives and talent of the new designers. This
application of sociotechnical systems theory improved not only the design of the product,
but the productivity and culture of the organization as a whole (Adler & Docherty, 1998).
Appelbaum (1997) reviewed sociotechnical theory as applied to work design
through the 25 years between his work and that of Cooper & Foster, but applied
sociotechnical theory more broadly as a change agent or intervention strategy in evolving
organizations. He proposed a series of approximately 30 questions that should be
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considered when developing a sociotechnical organization. The questions were intended
to eliminate mistakes in applying too strong of an influence from the organizational
design professional instead of focusing on the needs and problems that belong to the
organization itself (Appelbaum, 1997).
As Appelbaum broadened the application to work design, sociotechnical theory is
being applied, or being suggested for implementation, to solve a variety of problems in
business and organizational systems around the world; it is not just work design anymore.
As the industrial world becomes more and more machine-based, from the factory floor to
the board room, the requirement for humans to interface with technology becomes an
essential attribute of any organization, and the interfaces become more complex. Three
modern case studies demonstrated this shift in perspective and application involving
sociotechnical systems theory.
The first of the case studies evaluated discussed the application of sociotechnical
systems to addressing issues of human factors and ergonomics within virtual Intensive
Care Units (Carayon, 2006). The virtual aspect of this system increased the complexity
by integrating two geographically separated organizations through application of modern
technical systems to address the needs of individual patients. Through the application of
sociotechnical systems, specialists at one location were able to monitor the progress and
care of patients at the second location with the assistance of the less experienced local
staff (Carayon, 2006).
As a second example of the broadening of sociotechnical theory application,
Greenwood (2002) approached work redesign from the point of view of an outside
contractor providing “sociotechnical intervention.” The organization Greenwood was
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working with wishes to remain anonymous, but her walk through a Human Resource
Information System upgrade to multiple sub-organizations was a great example of how
the culture of an organization can impact the way a technology is implemented. The
difficulties an outside consultant has in understanding the existing relationships and how
they affect expectations and interactions within one organization, from one suborganization to the next were stressed (Greenwood, 2002).
With a different spin on sociotechnical systems, Haavik (2011) discussed using
sociotechnical theory as accident analysis for two case studies from the offshore drilling
industry in Norway. Safety analysis traditionally looks at the failed physical, mechanical,
and technical pieces as separate from the human reactions. Haavik’s work demonstrated
an area for expansion of lessons learned and organizational improvements through
applying sociotechnical theory to safety analysis after any accident or incident involving
both human and technical failure. This would account for the interaction and influence
that the technical failure plays on the human response, and vice versa (Haavik, 2011).
While the case studies mentioned above have valid applicability of the conceptual
theory and needs of a modern sociotechnical organization, none of the literature
addressed how this theory was to be applied. One is left questioning how the intricacies
and complexity of a sociotechnical organization can be captured in order to properly
manage both the human and technology needs in coordination.
In 1948, Warren Weaver introduced the concept of organized and disorganized
complexity within a system. Weaver used the phrase disorganized complexity to describe
interactions within a system that are not well understood. In contrast, studying the
complexity of a system can be seen as moving disorganized complexity into organized
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complexity (Weaver, 1948). A truly complex system will never reach the full transition
into organized complexity. If it is possible to fully understand the interactions of the
system, it is not truly complex. However, every move we make towards organizing the
complexity is a move in the direction of improved knowledge. When we improve our
understanding of the interactions of a system, we can more easily manipulate and manage
the interactions and make the system more efficient. This is the ultimate goal of systems
engineering.
One indicator of complexity would be system responses that cannot be predicted
by the given knowledge of the system. These responses can be tied to various attributes
of the system leading to these emergent behaviors. Included in these attributes are
interactions across scales (both spatial and temporal), self-directed components (such as
human operators), and distributed systems.
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are a sub-class of complex systems that
include adaptability as one of the defining characteristics of the system. The difficulty
caused by these interactions results in a need to develop meta-heuristic algorithms and
techniques to represent and model this complexity with any accuracy (Cilliers, 1998).
Cilliers identified eight qualities of a CAS. They are:
•

SIZE: too large for management by traditional techniques

•

INTERACTIONS: multiple points of integration

•

CASCADING: changes to one subsystem cause second, third, and higher changes
to other subsystems.

•

REBOUND: changes can cascade back onto the original subsystem

•

OPEN: open systems, constantly interacting with their environment.
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•

ENDOTHERMIC: requiring intake of resources to maintain stability

•

EVOLVING: changing, learning, and growing

•

ISOLATION: subsystems or components can function in isolation
Several techniques exist to manage and represent complexity within a system. In

general, these techniques all exist at a high level of abstraction; they must be tailored to
the system/sub-system/component being analyzed. There are several methods for
modeling, investigating, and evaluating these complex adaptive systems. These methods
include computational intelligence, agent-based techniques, and model based systems
engineering.
Computational intelligence (CI) covers a broad area of algorithm development to
allow for computers code to mimic natural processes, with the three major focus areas
being evolutionary computation, neural networks, and fuzzy systems. Each of these focus
areas uses different techniques, but they share a common characteristic in that they allow
for the manipulation and assessment of non-continuous, imprecise, mixed format, or
incomplete data so that it can be used to evaluate a solution to a given problem. These
problems range from numerical optimization to control theory and group membership.
Because of their ability to handle non-standard data, computational intelligence methods
have proven an invaluable tool for working with complex adaptive systems.
One of the ways in which computational intelligence techniques can be used to
assist in complexity management is in the area of modeling autonomous responses. One
of the most common methods used to model these types of behaviors are agent based
models. Most agents have four important features:
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Perception: the ability to detect changes in an environment, possibly including
other agents.



Performance: programmed to perform a set of behaviors including motion,
communication, and action.



Memory: the ability to record their perceptions of the environment.



Policy: performs to a set of heuristics that determine what behavior should be
performed based on the perception of the current environment.

These features allow for the agents to mimic any number of seemingly selfdirected actions, such as the behavior of soldiers occupying and interacting with the base
camp as well as potential invaders for security scenarios. Because each can be applied in
a specialized manner there are many situations that can be modeled if the proper
algorithms are applied.
Systems engineers use model based systems engineering (MBSE) to create
models of systems to study and troubleshoot the design and operation of systems,
whether they are simple, complicated, or complex. MBSE provides many benefits to the
system design process, such as reusability, traceability, and methods for consistency
checking of the model, and therefore the system representation.
Models can also be used to explore the responses of a system being assessed and
to determine the impact proposed changes may have on that system. This provides users
the ability to make several modifications quickly and determine the resulting system
performance. When an impact can be identified within seconds of a change in the virtual
model, with little associated cost, more changes can be explored for a more thorough
exploration of the search space. Designers traditionally look only at a single scale. MBSE

11

allows multiple scales to be rolled together to look at impacts that would not be seen from
a traditional design perspective. This can be used to identify a variety of weaknesses that
would otherwise be overlooked.

12

3

VIRTUAL ENGINEERING APPROACH

The approach presented here to manage complexity within a system is to develop
a virtual model of the system using model based systems engineering paradigms. As
discussed in 2.2.3, a virtual model will allow designers to capture and understand the
relationships between components of a system. Users can then test various solutions to
situations in a commitment free environment. Manipulation of the virtual model does not
require the time and resources that construction of even a prototype would require. In
addition, working with the virtual model removes the physical risks associated with
building and qualifying a full system. Once the model is completed, scenarios can be
built and tested to analyze the adequacy of the design.
Virtual models are a vast improvement over a typical multi-user approach to base
camp design. In a traditional design effort, elements are added with limited consideration
as to how they impact other components in large part because this information is not
apparent or available. This continuous improvement process is also limited by the
inherent involvement of the human element. As Hazelrigg (2007) pointed out, “…you
want to keep your processes as simple as possible, with as few steps as possible, and with
as few people involved as possible." Using a virtual model allows the system to be
designed by one person, with assistance of the computational engines and optimization
calculations. This gives virtual modeling an advantage over traditional modeling in that
every alternative can be tried in a quick and efficient manner with little cost to determine
which alteration provides the most efficient system without inducing human bias and
group dynamics as distracting factors.
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3.1

BASICS OF THE VIRTUAL MODEL
One method for capturing and recording the information about the system,

subsystem, components, and their relationships is by using the Systems Modeling
Language (SysML) (Friedenthal, 2008). SysML is a standard graphical modeling
language defined by the Object Management Group (OMG). This results in a graphical
record of the system information.
While SysML is not an executable format, the information contained in a SysML
model can be read and edited by other methods, such as VE-Suite. VE-Suite is a software
package developed at Iowa State University that is being used to access, pull information
from, and feed information back into the SysML model (Bryden & McCorkle, 2005).
VE-Suite feeds the information to computational models that do the engineering
calculations and can provide accurately altered information back to the SysML model. As
the information is updated back to the model, any changes trigger VE-Suite to provide
updated information to the various appropriate computational engines and the cycle
repeats. Figure 3.1 represents this interaction.

SysML

VE-Suite

Figure 3.1. Information Flow within a Virtual Model

CE
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3.2

STEPS TO BUILDING A VIRTUAL MODEL
3.2.1

Establish as a Sociotechnical System. While this approach could work

for other types of systems, we want to ensure the system as sociotechnical and that it
initially appears to meet Ciller’s (1998) eight qualities of a complex system. This sets up
a solid foundation for determining the level of complexity within the system. The type of
model discussed herein should not be applied to anything that is either too simple or
highly complex. The level of complexity is further determined in the next step.
3.2.2

Identify System/Subsystem Design. The next step to building a

comprehensive virtual model is to break the system into subsystems. A top down
approach is used to ensure the ability of the subsystems to represent the entire system,
much like the typical functional decomposition used in systems engineering. This also
allows the interfaces between subsystems to be captured from a high-level view. It cannot
be stressed highly enough that the intricate flows of information between systems need to
be identified. This information can be in the form of data, energy, physical resources,
manpower, etc. A preliminary capturing of what is known of the subsystems, and flows
within the systems, assists in determining the needs of the computational models. Figure
3.2 shows one example of how this method of diagraming flow at a high level can be
executed early in a project to capture what is known and what is recognized as existing
gaps before a decision to proceed is made.
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Known AB1
Unknown A1

System A

Unknown A2
Known AC1

Unknown B3

Unknown B1
System B

Known CB1

Unknown B2
Known BC1

Known DA1

Known DD1

Known DA1
Unknown D2

Unknown D1

Known BC1
System C

System D

Known CB1

Unknown C1
Known AC1
Known DC1

Figure 3.2. Example of Capturing Flow to Determine Complexity

As one might notice, there are two levels of information represented on the above
diagram: the known-knowns and the known-unknowns, with the unknowns visually
distinguishable. In the example above, they are shown by dotted lines. Also, be aware
there are also unknown-knowns (using Subject Matter Experts helps to reduce the
number of these) and unknown-unknowns. The unknown-unknowns are the factors that
can be observed when behavior escalates above and beyond what the model predicts. The
breakdown between knowns and unknowns is one factor that gives us an idea of the level
of complexity of the system. If there are no unknowns, the system likely is not complex.
The more unknowns there are (whether known-unknown, unknown-knowns, or
unknown-unknowns), the more complex the system is likely to be, and the more disparate
from reality the model can be expected to behave. The number of interactions can also
indicate the possibility of cascading and rebounding effects within the system, although
these effects are less obvious at this point in the analysis. These two factors, unknowns
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and integrations are the factors used in the two-factor scale proposed as an early
prediction tool for determining the complexity of a system.
3.2.3

Determine the Level of Complexity. In order to determine if the system

is complex, a two-factor scale is proposed. Table 3.1 and 3.2 are an example of a two
dimensional rubric used to assess a system and place it appropriately on the two-factor
graph (Figure 3.3).

Table 3.1 Rubric for Complexity Determination: Integration
INTEGRATION
LOW
1-2
EFFORT:
Easily
diagrammed by
hand, easily
understood

SYSTEM:
Majority of
interconnections
are to only one
other subsystem,
all flows move
in one direction.

3-4

5-6

EFFORT:
Moderate
difficulty to
diagram
manually but
can be
completed

EFFORT:
Diagram
executed with
difficult manual
work, or assisted
by computer
graphics

SYSTEM:
SYSTEM:
Moderate
Moderate
recursive
recursive
feedback within
feedback with
the system or
interconnections
interconnections
between three to
linking several
five major subsub-systems at
systems
different points

7-8
EFFORT:
Diagram
requires
software
assistance to be
completed,
resulting product
is easily
understood
SYSTEM:
Many subsystems are
connected at one
or two different
interfaces,
several feedback
and control
loops with
occasional
nonlinear
behavior

HIGH
9-10
EFFORT:
Diagram
requires
computer
assistance to
model, resulting
product is not
easily
comprehended
SYSTEM:
Interconnections
exist between
most major subsystems,
recursive
feedbacks and
control loops
common
practice, many
causing nonlinear behavior
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Table 3.2 Rubric for Complexity Determination: Unknowns
UNKNOWNS
LOW
1-2
<10% Unknown

3-4
10-20%
Unknown

5-6
20-35%
Unknown

Minor
Moderate
modification to modification or
existing
expansion of
technology,
existing
incremental
technology
implementation.

HIGH
9-10
>50% Unknown

7-8
35-50%
Unknown

New and/or
Major redesign
New and/or
experimental
of existing
experimental
system with
technology or system with new several untested
new system
untested
components with
using tested
components
multiple
legacy
functions.
components
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LY X
GH LE
HI MP

CO

9
8
CO
X

6
CO

5

IC
PL
M

Interactions

E
PL
M

7

E
AT
D

4
3
E
PL
M
SI

2
1
1

2

3

4

5
6
Unknowns

7

8

9

10

Figure 3.3 Two-factor Graph of System Complexity
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The two factors used for this scale are the number of interactions and the number
of unknowns, each rated on a scale of 1 to 10. The numerical values for the unknowns
and interactions can be weighted to account for differences in the impact upon the system
and other factors such as size and separability of system elements, with the numerical
values tied to a numerical and/or Likert scale evaluation of subject matter expert input.
The lower corner, with low interactions that are highly known, indicates a simple system.
If a system is either highly interactive, but well known (upper left corner) or lowly
interactive and highly unknown (lower right corner) are probably complicated, but do not
require the same degree of modeling a complex system does. The target zone for this
technique is a system that, before modeling, rates in the complex zone, is in the
moderately integrated and moderately unknown. The remaining zone of the scale, at the
upper right corner, represents a system that is highly integrated and highly unknown. This
combination would suggest a system that may be too complex to be modeled with any
degree of accuracy. In this situation, there are two alternatives: either limit the scope of
the model to represent a smaller system, i.e. to include a fewer subsystems (and therefore
fewer interactions), or keep asking questions of subject matter experts until more of the
unknowns become known.
While this scale provides the basics of whether a virtual modeling approach
should continue to be pursued for a system, other factors need to be considered. This
scale covers only two factors that make a system complex. However, they are the two
factors that are most easily observable early in the modeling process. This tool makes a
few assumptions, mapping the two early observable factors to the eight qualities
published by Cillers (1998). As mentioned previously, the cascading and rebounding
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effects can be suggested by a high degree of interaction. If some of the interactions
involve the environment, reach outside the defined bounds of the system, the system is
open. The sociotechnical nature of the system is tied to the endothermic quality, as
humans will always require outside energy, either in food and water or in replacement
manpower. Whether the system is able to learn, change, and evolve is a quality that
cannot be observed at this point in the modeling process. Another quality that has not
been addressed by Ciller’s qualities, but is essential to understanding complexity, is the
existence and implications of non-linear interactions. This is tied to both unknowns and
integrations. The higher the interaction rate, the more non-linearities are expected. Also,
some of the unknowns will likely be due to poorly understood non-linearities.
If the system in question meets the criteria of a) being sociotechnical and b) falls
into the appropriate zone on our numerical scale, we can conclude that it is an
appropriately complex sociotechnical system and proceed with building a virtual model.
This two-factor complexity evaluation tool has also been tested for one
application as a post-design evaluation tool. The purpose of the post-design test is to
measure the difference in appearance of complexity from the initial stages of the project
(pre-evaluation by experts) to the post-evaluation by end-users. The results of that test
supported our hypothesis that virtual modeling can increase the understanding of a
system and therefore decrease the appearance of complexity, making the system easier to
manage. Details of this test are found in section four, as they are explained with the
Virtual Forward Operating Base (VFOB) system they were tested upon.
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3.2.4

Identifying Computational Engines. Once the initial graphical flow

model represents all knowns (known-knowns and known-unknowns) the computational
engines can be selected. Two options for this include choosing from commercial off-theshelf (COTS) packages, or developing a piece custom designed for the model. Factors in
this decision include the integration capabilities of the available COTS packages and the
level of specialization needed for a particular system. These computational engines need
to meet all of the requirements for integration into the larger model as well as accurately
modeling the specific behaviors they are chosen to represent. This is key to keeping a
model accurate; the model will only be as good as the computational components.
3.2.5

Integration of Computational Engines. The third major step of this

process is to program the agent (in our case, within the VE-Suite framework) to identify
changes to the SysML model and feed those changes to the computation engines possibly
effected by the altered information. This is where the detailed information about the
integration of subsystems is essential. If a change is made to a component in SysML, by
the user or by the computational engines, that information needs to be fed to the
computation components of all systems effected by that component. This allows the
second, third, and higher level effects of a single change to be represented in the system.
3.2.6

Account for the Known-Unknowns. The computational engines work

well for purely technical engineered systems where actions and reactions follow
understood logical rules of behavior to a high degree of accuracy. However, such engines
do not accurately account for the human involvement in a system. To account for the
known-unknowns, such as effects of humans on the system, one method is to establish a
baseline of component behaviors and realistic resource usage. This can be developed by
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obtaining expert data from real scenarios. This data becomes the default settings for the
model, but can be adapted by the user based on environmental factors of the instance
being modeled. This process of base-lining can also help the model to account for nonlinear reactions due to unknown interactions, or poorly understood reactions. Analysis of
these reactions within a model using base line data can improve knowledge of the
previously unknown interactions.
3.2.7

Make the Model Usable. From here, a user interface will need to be

designed. The state of the system needs to be in a format that is easily understood and
altered by the user. The final step is the validation of the final virtual model. This
involves an expert or a group of experts, preferably independent of the design process,
manipulating the model and validating the changes to the system.
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4
4.1

APPLICATION TO BASE CAMP WORK

DEFINITION OF PROBLEM
The Department of Defense has steadily been moving towards virtual models for

Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR), battle space simulations (Virtual Battlespace 2), and advanced
weapons systems, but to date these simulation techniques have been applied only to
combat operations and weapon systems. To achieve the full benefit of these computer
simulations, it is necessary to develop a tool that allows designers across the armed forces
access to these new virtual engineering methods. Providing these tools to military
professionals will speed the system design process, lower development costs, and provide
a final system that has been verified to meet the end user’s needs.
The ultimate goal of this research is to develop a versatile modeling approach that
enables army engineers to layout a base camp design in a virtual environment where asset
attributes are considered as well as the spatial location. Using virtual engineering tools
allows for the configuration, evaluation, and modification of components in a virtual
environment where changes can be made and the results observed quickly with no
material costs. In the case of base camp design, this provides a holistic method of
evaluation to promote mission success by providing service members with appropriate
support and resources. A variety of systems can take advantage of the software, ranging
from a laptop computer to an immersive virtual reality system. This versatility results in a
tool capable of being used by designers to layout the base camp using an immersive
virtual reality system at a research lab or by a deployed engineer in the field making
changes to the facility layout. In addition, this virtual environment allows collaboration
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over distance, so that the layout changes made by the deployed army engineer would be
synchronized with a collaborator in the virtual reality system, and vice versa. The end
result is a toolkit that uses a virtual engineering framework to enable the modeling and
simulation of the dynamic interactions between base camp components, allowing
personnel to modify and evaluate a variety of configurations to determine base camp
capabilities and limitations
4.2

BASE CAMP LITERATURE REVIEWS
To learn more about the current structure and requirements for building a military

base camp, the Construction and Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of
Responsibility: “The Sand Book” (Headquarters, 2009) and Base Camp Facility
Standards for Contingency Operations: “The Red Book” (United States Army, 2004)
were used to derive our utility components as well as the performance requirements of
each component. This resulted in the areas of power, water, wastewater, and security
being chosen as our primary emphasis areas for our survey of off-the-shelf software.
A preliminary survey of scholarly research was conducted to see what other work
had been performed in this field. A selection of works performed by Argonne National
Lab in conjunction with the Construction Engineering Research Lab (CERL) was found
to be relevant (Sydelko, et al, 1999; Sydelko, et al, 2000; Sydelko, et al, 2001). This work
focused on modeling the environmental impacts of base camps on the surrounding
ecosystems. The process of moving to an object-oriented model was noted, along with a
few items from the toolkit that enabled real-time editing from the field. These are topics
that may be touched on in the future development of our product.
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The implementation of these tools involves the physical layout of a forward
operating base camp and supply chain plus operational requirement models. The current
method for laying out a base camp is through manual integration of tools such as the
Theater Construction Management System (TCMS) for placement of computer aided
drafting (CAD) models. These tools allow for the integration of computer drawings and
the Army Facilities Component System (AFCS) design information to a computer
representation of the base camp layout. While helpful, this method has a very limited
ability to interact with the components being placed in the design space, showing only
information relating to the spatial placement of components on a single desktop or laptop
computer. These short-comings prevent it from being fully utilized as a design tool for
creating models and simulation scenarios to fully investigate the resources necessary to
meet the lifecycle needs of an operating base camp.
4.3

BASE CAMPS AS SOCIOTECHNCIAL SYSTEMS
Human Factors, the study of designing technology to complement the human

body, has been applied to the design of military technical systems for years. Military
Standard 1472 (1989) established a basis of design standards for any equipment designed
for human use within the U.S. Military. This is also being implemented by other nations.
Walker, et al (2008) proposed the application of sociotechnical contexts to the United
Kingdom’s military command and control. Jenkins, et al, (2011) used the U.K. military
land headquarters as a case study in application of domain analysis in improving
performance of complex socio-technical systems. Additionally, the field of systems
engineering has improved the efficiency and understanding of many military grade
weapons systems and how their users interact and use these systems. However, the
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application of systems engineering for non-weapon complex sociotechnical systems has
not previously been attempted.
For a complex system such as the military base camp, humans are behaving in
ways that impact every utility and subsystem of the model. The inherent involvement of
humans within a base camp system requires acknowledgement of their impact on the
systems at hand. Historically, engineers have skirted around the concept of modeling
human behavior. While Pentland & Liu (1999) claimed to be able to model human
behavior to a 95% accuracy using dynamic models and Markov chains, they focused on
only modeling a single individual performing a single behavior. Modeling one person’s
performance of a single focused task, or even a series of focused tasks to a significant
degree of accuracy is reasonable. In fact, there has been a great deal of research focused
on modeling military task-behavior; The National Research Council (1998and 2008) and
others have written books on the subject. However, modeling individual and
organizational behavior throughout days, weeks, months, and years is a challenge to
engineers who are used to working with logical systems. This is one of the challenges
faced when developing an accurate model of a base camp.
Not only is the base camp system inherently sociotechnical, it is also a complex
adaptive system (CAS). A CAS is defined by a number of things, and a military base
comp meets all of the requirements identified by Cilliers (1998):



SIZE - In a CAS, the size of the system surpasses traditional methods of
understanding the interactions between components. In a base camp, interactions
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are not understood by conventional designs due to the number of varying
components: number of personnel, different mission types, etc.


INTERACTIONS - Components in CAS involve multiple points of integration, so
that each component affects and is affected by multiple components. For example,
a single generator driving a motor on a pump providing water pressure for a
dining facility will be integrated with the power system, the water system, the
fueling system, and the manpower component.



CASCADING - Small changes to components can have large impacts on the
system. One generator going out on a base camp could cause a cascading blackout
affecting the rest of the camp.



REBOUND: When a change is made to one system, effects are triggered through
surrounding systems that can cause the single change to reflect back on to the
same subsystem, thus triggering another round of downstream effects. The
inclusion of a Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) at a base camp
will obviously have an effect on the water system. However, it will also require an
increase in power usage, and an increase in manpower, which will in turn cause
an increase in housing and dining facilities, which will affect the amount of water
needed to be produced by the ROWPU.



OPEN: CAS are open systems, continually interacting with their surroundings. In
the example of base camp utilities, the surrounding environment influences the
sourcing, usage, and disposal activities.
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ENDOTHERMIC: A CAS maintains operations outside of equilibrium, and
constantly requires input of energy or resources to remain stable. Base camps are
constantly being supplied with resources from food to fuel from outside sources.



EVOLVING: Base camps have varying missions and designs, with the past
having substantial impacts on current and future designs. This is typical of a CAS.



ISOLATION: Subsystems of a CAS tend to respond to behavior within close
proximity, without consideration for the larger system as a whole.
The base camp consists of an integration of subsystems. Each subsystem is, of

itself, complex as well as interdependent upon other subsystems. The identification of
these interdependencies is key to understanding, and subsequently managing, the
complexity of the overall system. The next step is to look at the input and output of each
utility to begin to determine the integration points.
4.4

IDENTIFY SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM DESIGN
The integration of water in utility planning affects the following other systems:

power, fuel, wastewater, and solid waste. The amount of water required to sustain the
base camp can possibly lead to an increase in personnel to manage the water supply. The
increase in manpower then increases the power, fuel, waste, and water requirements in a
trickle-down effect. The planning factors for water volumes need to take into account the
number of personnel, various operations of the personnel, as well as the climate in which
the base is located.
The process above is repeated to determine integration points for all other
subsystems: power, wastewater, solid waste, force protection, manpower, and mission
activities. From there, we need to determine what type of load is expected for any variety

28

of base camp that could be modeled. For this project, models need to be designed for base
camps ranging from 50 to 20,000 person camps. To determine our baselines of load
information, we relied again on TCMS, the Construction and Base Camp Development in
the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (The Sand Book) and Base Camp Facility
Standards for Contingency Operations (The Red Book), and on expert input from the
field. In June of 2011, a Base Camp Workshop was held at Missouri S&T. This provided
access to a group of subject matter experts who were able to provide a minimal set of
data on usage, prioritization, and a collection of anecdotes that helped the developers
identify non-conventional impacts to the system. Once load levels are determined, either
through expert input or data analysis, the parameters are used to develop equations based
on the expected usage of each utility, broken down by facility. The product of this effort
is a lengthy series of both linear and non-linear equations describing the usage of each
utility. This allows for a model of facility demand based on expert provided information
that is a function of population size of the camp. These equations are then set into a
mathematical solver for simultaneous processing. This allows the system of equations to
rebalance itself each time a modification is made to the demand, giving an initial baseline
of utility usage for the base camp as laid out on the map.
The resulting basic schematic can be seen in Figure 4.1 on the next page. The
“knowns,” as previously discussed in Section 3.2.2, are shown in black and the
“unknowns” are shown in grey. Five major subsystems, each utlities, were initially
identified as requiring their own computational engines. As one may notice, the
sociotechnical aspects of this design are initially identified as unknowns. Further research
on the human element of base camp design is required for the model to be accurate.
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Figure 4.1 Initial Base Camp System Flow Diagram
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4.5

DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF COMPLEXITY
A tool using two early-observable factors has been developed to determine the

complexity of a proposed model from the planning stages of a modeling project. As a test
of this tool’s ability to accurately capture the complexity of a proposed system, test of the
system was composed. The primary hypothesis stated that the tool could reliably be used
to determine the complexity of a system. As a secondary test of the tool, another
hypothesis was proposed that users of a tool would rate the system as less complex than
the expert group. Both of these hypotheses were tested using one survey.
4.5.1

A Test of the Two-Factor Complexity Rating Tool. In order to test the

reliability of the two-factor rating tool and the perceived complexity between user and
expert groups, a four question survey with supporting background information was given
to two different audiences. The first group was a set that will be referred to as the experts.
This group contained seven individuals with high familiarity with the project due to
involvement in the development. Four individuals were from the design team on at
Missouri S&T and three were from the customer organization.
The second set of individuals, referred to here-in as the users, were members of
the Captain’s Career Course on Fort Leonard Wood. These individuals were assigned the
task of designing a base camp during their coursework. A demonstration version of the
VFOB product was briefed to the 80 individuals, along with the opportunity to design a
base camp using the demonstration version. The theory being tested is that the second
group, the users, would view the system as lower in complexity than the expert group.
This would support the hypothesis that a perceived reduction of complexity is
accomplished by using a virtual engineering modeling tool.
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The survey led the respondents through the first steps of determining the
complexity of the system. The first question asked whether a base camp fit the definitions
of a sociotechnical system. The expert group unanimously responded with a yes. The user
group had a 73.8% yes vote. Both of these sets of data individually passed a chi squared
test rejecting the null hypothesis (Experts = 0.0081, Users=.000021). When compared
against each other, a chi squared test for independence between the two groups resulted
in an 88.1% independence rate. This is considered a failure against the standard 95%
threshold. However, this is a promising result. The conclusion is that both groups agree
that base camps qualify as sociotechnical systems.
The second question asked whether a base camp fit the eight qualities of a
complex adaptive system (Cillers, 1998).Again, the expert group unanimously responded
that a base camp is a complex adaptive system. The user group, however, only had a
56.3% yes rate. This question failed to reject the null-hypothesis. Possible conclusions
include that the user group had a poor understanding of what a complex adaptive system
is, or under-estimated the complexity of the system after using the design tool. When this
survey is conducted again, a follow-up question will be included to ask, “If no, please
specify which of the eight qualities of a complex system does a base camp not meet, and
why?” This will assist in understanding the low consensus of responses among the user
group.
The third question asked the respondents to use a rubric to rate a base camp on the
interactions of the system. The rubric is provided in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Interaction Rubric
1-2

3-4

5-6

7-8

Interactions

EFFORT:
EFFORT:
EFFORT:
Diagram
EFFORT:
Moderate
Diagram
requires
Easily
difficulty to
executed with
software
diagrammed by
diagram
difficult manual assistance to be
hand, easily
manually but
work, or assisted
completed,
understood
can be
by computer
resulting
completed
graphics
product is easily
understood
SYSTEM:
Many subSYSTEM:
systems are
SYSTEM:
SYSTEM:
Moderate
connected at
Majority of
Moderate
recursive
one or two
interconnections
recursive
feedback within
different
are to only one
feedback with
the system or
interfaces,
other
interconnections
interconnections
several feedback
subsystem, all
between three
linking several
and control
flows move in
to five major
sub-systems at
loops with
one direction
sub-systems
different points
occasional
nonlinear
behavior

9-10
EFFORT:
Diagram
requires
computer
assistance to
model, resulting
product is not
easily
comprehended
SYSTEM:
Interconnection
s exist between
most major subsystems,
recursive
feedbacks and
control loops
common
practice, many
causing nonlinear behavior

The resulting data on this question had a mean of 7.0 on the Likert scale, with a
standard deviation of 1.4, by the expert group. The user group responded with a mean of
5.8 with a standard deviation of 1. 7. Both sets passed the chi squared test, rejecting a null
hypothesis. When compared against each other, however, the results failed the chi
squared test for independence at a standard 95% threshold. As a result, further data is
planned to verify the difference in mean and gather more information to either support or
reject the idea that users find the system less complex after using a modeling tool. One
possible explanation for this failure is due to familiarity with base camps due to previous
deployments. The subjects could be biased due prior exposure and not relying purely on
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the modeling tool to base their answers. The data from this question is plotted in a bar
graph shown in Figure 4.2.
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10
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Figure 4.2 – Graph of Interactions Ratings

The fourth question on the survey asked the respondents to use a rubric to
evaluate a base camp on the basis of unknowns. The rubric in Table 4.2 was to be used to
help determine placement on the Likert scale. Experts rated the system as a 7.29, with a
standard deviation of 1.25. The user group rated the base camp system as a 4.65, with a
standard deviation of 1.81. The chi-squared test rejected the null hypothesis. A chi-test
for independence passed for this question, with a 99.8% independence rate. This suggests
a significant difference between the evaluation of unknowns between the experts
contributing to the development of the modeling tool, and the users of the demonstration
modeling tool. This response supports our hypothesis that users of a modeling tool view
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the system as less complex. The significant dip in the expert results graph, Figure 4.3, is
due to only having 7 responses from that group. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 are individual graphs
of results from each of the two subject groups.

Table 4.2 – Unknowns Rubric
3-4

5-6

7-8

9-10

<10% Unknown

10-20%
Unknown

20-35%
Unknown

35-50%
Unknown

>50% Unknown

Minor
modification to
existing
technology,
incremental
implementation

Moderate
modification or
expansion of
existing
technology

Major redesign
of existing
technology or
new system
using tested
legacy
components

New and/or
experimental
system with new
untested
components

New and/or
experimental
system with
several untested
components
with multiple
functions

Unknowns
Percentage of Responses

Unknowns

1-2
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0.10
0.05
0.00

Expert Data
End-User Data

1
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2
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4
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7

8

9

10
HIGH

Figure 4.3 – Graph of Unknowns Ratings
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Figure 4.4 – Graph of User Data
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Figure 4.5 – Graph of Expert Data

When all of the results are plotted to the two-factor evaluation tool, the results
appear to support our hypothesis. The expert group rated the system as complex

36

(moderately high in complexity) using our two factor rubric. The user group rated the
system as complicated (moderately lower in complexity). On Figure 4.6, the two Xs
represent the mean from each the two data sets. The vertical and horizontal bars are
representative of one standard deviation from each mean. The upper right set
corresponds to the expert data, and the lower left set is the user data.
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Overall, the comparison of the two data collections did result in a 98.8%
independence evaluation. This supports the hypothesis that the expert group and the user
group view the complexity of the system differently, based on using the two factor
approach.
4.5.2

Future Work on the Two-Factor Complexity Rating Tool. Further data

using this tool will be collected by submitting a slightly revised survey to the next group
of the Captain’s Career Course students taking base-camp design training at Ft. Leonard
Wood. The intention is to evaluate their perspective of base camp complexity prior to
being introduced to the VFOB modeling tool. This should be followed up with a survey
that collects their perception of complexity in a base camp after being briefed on and
using the demonstration version of the VFOB design tool.
Additionally, some validation of assumptions is necessary to further support this
complexity estimation tool. The two-factors used in this approach need to be concretely
tied to the eight factors they are intended to represent. Also, this tool should be tested
against other socio-technical complex adaptive systems.
4.6

IDENTIFYING COMPUTATIONAL ENGINES
The base camp system has been identified as sociotechnical and meeting the

preliminary expectations for a complex system. A basic system flow depicting
subsystems and integrated flows has been developed. The two-factor complexity
evaluation tool has been used to verify that a model could be useful to increase the
understanding and reduce the perception of complexity in the system. The next step in the
process is to identify computational engines to model each of those subsystems. Upon
request of the customer, a search for appropriate COTS modeling software was
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performed. Packages covering electrical power production and distribution were the first
to be evaluated.
4.6.1

Power. The search for COTS software began with a survey of the military

standards applicable to power generation and distribution. This was to ensure that the
commercial modeling software were compatible with the standards of military
application.
4.6.1.1

Determining the power performance measures. There are two

divisions of generator based power used in base camp operations. The smaller output
capacity, and therefore highly targeted output, is referred to as tactical power. Tactical
power incorporates both precise and utility generation. Tactical generators (TACGENS)
are limited to a range of 0.5 to 200 KW output. This makes it the most common type of
power provided to small forward operations. Power for use on larger bases is supplied by
generators is referred to as prime power. Prime power plants consist of non-tactical
generators larger than 200 KW. Modeling prime power would be similar to modeling
usage from commercial power. This type of generation is commonly used for
communications centers or intermediate/semi-permanent staging bases. Commercial
power is a possible alternative for larger operations, but rare for smaller base camps
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 2007). A COTS modeling package would
need to address both on-site generation as well as commercial supply.
Distribution systems for TACGENs are not highly complex. However, that does
not mean an elimination of planning and forethought in designing the layout. In order to
make a generator-based system more efficient, placement of generators is a prime
concern. The placement should be near enough to a facility to reduce surface-laid
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transmission cables, but centrally located as to provide access by a centralized fueling
system and streamline preventative maintenance activities.
A secondary point of consideration when designing for the use of TACGEN is the
required redundancy for continued operations. TACGEN requires a number of generators
be on stand-by for emergency and maintenance situations. An increased number of
generators and an increase in required periodic maintenance also lead to an increase in
manpower. An increase in manpower increases the load on the sustainment facilities,
which in turn requires more power and more manpower. This is one example of the
rebounding quality of a CAS.
If one recalls the base camp flow diagram, Figure 4.1 the inputs required to
produce power for a base camp are few in number, but substantial in impact. However,
power capacity is a far reaching concern. The demands indicated by the dotted lines in
Figure 4.1 are often beyond the knowledge of base camp designers. Designers may know
the needs of the first wave of occupants, but planning for future occupation of the base is
sketchy at best. Be that as it may, the demands are significant enough to justify
recognition of their substantial impact on the system. A change in mission will severely
impact the volume of utilities needed for any given base.
All of this gives one a basic understanding of what an appropriate software
package needs to be able to model. This information was used to assemble a list of
technical performance measures to assess the fit of the COTS modeling packages. A
second set of performance measures specifically addressed the need of the software
package to be easily integrated into the bigger full-system model. The performance
measures were then assembled into a weighted decision analysis matrix. This technique
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allows for a series of alternatives to be measured and compared based on compatibility to
the performance measures. The addition of a weighted rank, assigned to each
performance measure, allowed for some measures to more heavily influence the results,
as deemed appropriate. For this project, the weights were proposed to the customer based
on background research, allowing the customer to make any adjustments necessary.
4.6.1.2

Identifying potential COTS packages. The search for COTS packages

began with once the appropriate performance measures had been identified. It was noted
that hundreds of building energy modeling packages had been developed, enhanced and
used throughout the building energy community. The Department of Energy had
published a survey of various packages (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy). That survey provided an up-to-date comparison of features and
capabilities of various building energy software packages, based on the information
provided by the vendor. It explained the basic concept of energy simulation in building
design and the properties of simulation design tools. The range of applications and the
limitations of existing simulation tools were also described.
The number of power modeling packages in commercial space was significant, so
the list was narrowed down to those packages surveyed and approved by the Department
of Energy. (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy) The
choices were further refined by including packages with the highest match of capabilities
required from an electrical power model, based upon the requirements from review of
United States military standards.
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4.6.1.3 Evaluating COTS packages. Each software package was evaluated at a
high level to determine the degree to which it met the requirement for modeling power
usage of an army base camp. A rank was assigned by an electrical engineering subject
matter expert by using the criteria in Table 4.3. That ranking was then multiplied by the
weight, as found in the second column of Table 4.4, for each performance requirement.
These weighted rankings were entered into the corresponding cell, then each column was
summed to provide an overall score for each software package. The higher the overall
score, the better match the software package was expected to be in meeting the needs of
the end product.
Along the top of Table 4.4 each software package was assigned a column. For
each performance measure, an individual package was assigned a weighted rank, based
on how well it meets the performance measure in that row. The possible ranks were
limited to 0, 4, or 9. For example, if we consider the price of the software, a rank of 9 was
given if the software license if free, a rank of 4 if the cost of the single license of the
software was less than $5000, and a rank of 0 is used if the cost is over $5000. The
weighted rank of the technical performance measure was then obtained by multiplying
the rank with its corresponding weight. The resulting product was shown in the
appropriate cell on the table.

Table 4.3 - Ranking Criteria
Rank

Level of Contribution

0
4
9

No element contributes to the objective
More than one element contributes to the objective
All the elements contribute to the objective
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Table 4.4 - Capabilities of Electrical Power Modeling Software
TRNSYS PSCAD
(Weighted (Weighted
Performance Measure
Weight Rank)
Rank)
Electrical Modeling Performance
Electrical Load
0.26
Distribution &
management
On-site generation and
0.13
1.17
1.17
utility electricity
1.17
1.17
Renewable Components 0.13
Power Generators
0.24
Internal Combustion
0.04
Engine Generator
Combustion Turbine
0.04
Micro generation
0.04
integrated with thermal
simulation
Grid connection
0.04
Electric Conductors
0.04
0.04
Building Power Loads
Integration with Other Packages
Interface
0.10
Command Line
0.08
GUI
0.02
Data File
0.3
XMI File
0.04
Text file
0.04
IGES File
0.04
DAT File
0.04
DWG File
0.04
Open Source
0.10
Cost
0.01
Computer Platform
0.09
Windows
0.03
Mac OS
0.03
Linux
0.03
Weighted Total
1.00

ID-Spec
Large
(Weighted
Rank)

Energy Plus eQUEST
(Weighted (Weighted
Rank)
Rank)

ESP-r
(Weighted
Rank)

1.17

1.17

1.17

1.17

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.52

0.36

0.36

0.36

0.36

0.36

0.36

0.16
0.36

0.36
0.36

0.36
0.00

0.36
0.16

0.36
0.00

0.00
0.36

0.36
0.36
0.36

0.36
0.36
0.36

0.00
0.00
0.36

0.36
0.00
0.36

0.00
0.00
0.36

0.36
0.36
0.36

0.72
0.18

0.72
0.18

0.00
0.18

0.00
0.18

0.00
0.18

0.00
0.18

0.00
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.36
0.90
0.04

0.00
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04

0.00
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.36
0.00
0.04

0.00
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04

0.00
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.36
0.00
0.09

0.00
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.90
0.09

0.27
0.27
0.27
7.67

0.12
0.12
0.12
6.16

0.27
0.00
0.00
3.46

0.12
0.12
0.12
3.71

0.27
0.00
0.00
3.51

0.27
0.27
0.27
5.83

The maximum total weighted rank that software could obtain is nine. The
weighted matrix (Table 4.3) showed that TRANYS software package received the highest
weighted total of 7.67 followed by PSCAD with a weighted total of 6.16.
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4.6.1.4

A failed technique. In order to allow for successful integration into the

base camp model, the software packages would need to fully meet all of the integration
requirements and model the utilities as used in the military standard. Due to the flexibility
and mobility required of military installations, commercial standards are not feasible.
After analyzing the results of the weighted matrix as applied to the power modeling
packages, the approach of a weighted matrix was determined not to be a good fit for this
application. This led the analysis of the performance metrics for integration and the
technical performance measures pertinent to each specific utility as more of a required
checklist than a decision matrix. Thus, the remaining utilities were addressed in terms of
technical performance measures required and the fit of the “best” package, but did not
use a weighted matrix.
4.6.2

Water Modeling. Performance measures were determined using the same

process as described with the power models in 4.6.1, a review of military standards and
discussions with the customer about field application.
4.6.2.1 Determining water modeling performance measures. Water supply to
forward area bases is a critical resource to campaign success. Consumable water for base
camp operations is split into three classifications: potable, non-potable, and drinking
water. The volumes of each classification will vary greatly upon a number of factors. For
most base camps, water is kept on hand for only one day’s operations. This method
requires water to be resupplied daily (Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1990).
Non-potable water may come from a local environmental source, a pre-existing
well, or it could be trucked in. It is feasible to drill a well for these locations if one is not
available, however circumstances may prevent this option.
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Some locations can support water purification operations. In these situations, nonpotable water can be processed into potable. Lakes, rivers, and wells can be subject to
purification on demand. However, in theatre many tactical operations will not have
access to water purification systems, to excess storage, or to distribution equipment. In
these cases, potable water can also be trucked in.
Although it is officially a last resort source, in today’s U.S. military, troops rely
heavily upon bottled water for drinking supplies. This requires delivery through the same
supply convoy that will distribute fuel to power generators the mentioned in the previous
section, and is subject to the same risks. Bottled water also has the added downfall of
adding significantly to the solid waste stream of the base camp (Anderson, 2011).
For patrol bases, only potable water is supplied to the base. Water is typically
stored in five gallon cans. In some circumstances, bottled water is available for drinking.
An occasional water buffalo (stainless steel or fiberglass water tanks on wheels, often in
400 gallon capacities) is deployable in some scenarios. A water buffalo can be outfitted
with a wash station to provide for personal sanitation needs. For combat outposts, the
same style of water buffalo is used consistently, and assigned a particular location within
the camp.
When a base camp expands to the size of a Forward Operating Base (1000-2000
personnel), water supply starts getting more complicated. These base camps start out
being serviced by a network of water buffalos for water distribution but may change to a
water distribution system. Shower and laundry services start occurring on base and
requiring additional water intake. For smaller camps, Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) are the
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only option for day-to-day sustenance, but as the base camp grows, dining facilities
(DFACs) start to be used.
4.6.2.2 COTS water modeling package. A satisfactory water model proved
difficult to locate in our survey of COTS software packages. Most of the software
packages billed as “water modeling” were actually troubleshooting software for old
leaking systems, or water quality control models without the capability of modeling
usage or distribution. However, one product was found that included open database
architecture and modeled the energy consumption of the distribution system.
WaterNetworks is used to extend the features of EPANet, a set of water modeling tools
by different municipal and military installations (Boss International, 2010).
WaterNetworks adds a graphical user interface, provides compatibility with AutoCAD
and Microstation, and communicates with ArcGIS databases. While this software
package integrates well, it should be noted that these modeling packages were intended to
model a more permanent in-ground set of pipes and equipment, which is rare for smaller
military installations.
4.6.3

COTS Wastewater Modeling Package. Again, the search for a

wastewater treatment modeling software package began with the requirements stated in
the Red Book (United States Army, 2004). A variety of COTS software applications were
found to model sanitary sewer design and water treatment plants separately. However,
there was no one software package that could model both the drainage requirements for a
community and the requirements for processing and treatment of the waste products, and
so a combination of packages would be required for this effort. As with the water system,
these modeling packages were intended to model a more permanent in-ground set of
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pipes and equipment, not the temporary and flexible equipment the military most often
deploys to FOBs.
4.6.3.1 COTS sanitary sewer modeling package. HYDRA was a software
program by Pizer (Pizer International, 2010) which claimed to already be in use by
military bases to model and design urban drainage systems. Hydra prided itself on the
ability to identify design problems before they become an issue to the public; issues like
sewer overflows, street flooding, and surcharged pipes. HYDRA also offered the ability
to evaluate new projects as extensions of an already calibrated model; such as evaluating
the base as an extension to a pre-existing local sewer system.
For integration merit, Hydra had advantages and disadvantages. Hydra had the
ability to provide output in the form of formal reports and/or tabular data, profiles and
hydrographs, CAD files, and GIS files. The product included the ability to incorporate
some user defined elements, but was not open source; it was also only functional on
Windows platforms. The cost for a single license at time of evaluation was approximately
$4500, and there was no guarantee that it would fit our needs.
4.6.3.2 COTS treatment plant modeling package design. GPS-X was the
world's leading wastewater treatment plant modeling and simulation software package
(Environmental Software Solutions, Inc., 2010). GPS-X had the ability to model many
different types of wastewater treatment, from biological and settling treatment processes
through influent, anaerobic, and filtration treatment methods. While the information
available did not specifically include some of the elements needed for our complex
integration project, GPS-X does claimed to provide dynamic cost operating models for
various processes.
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This Windows-based product claimed to have open-code models available for
editing and the ability to customize the outputs. There was also a graphical drag and drop
user interface that may prove helpful for the end users.
4.6.4

Force Protection & Security. A preliminary survey was performed for

COTS software that could accurately model the security needs of a military base camp.
As would be expected, there is not a huge market for this in the commercial world, and
the initial survey turned up nothing worthwhile. A short search for security modeling
software targeting gated communities and municipalities was also of little help, as did a
search of private security companies and DoD contractors. Nobody executes security the
way the Department of Defense does, so the expectation of finding accurate models
available to the public was low from the start. One thing that was found that might be of
use was a package for modeling the layout of a base camp with DRASH shelters,
including requirements like stand-off distances. This was found in VTap2.0. This could
be useful for the three dimensional layout capability and the user interface (DHS
Technologies, LLC, 2010).
As a result of this discussion with the customer, force protection and security
engineering was moved into the Department of Defense’s area of effort in contribution to
this project. While the inputs and outputs of the force protection arena remained a load
taken into consideration when calculating the needs of the system, the force protection
piece itself is being treated as a “black box” for the base camp model.
4.6.5

Other Software. In the process of searching for possible modeling

packages, a few other areas were explored with no profitable results. The area of solid
waste processing was surveyed, for example. This produced a few products used for
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modeling the customer costs of waste processing, but nothing that could predict the
volumes or the energy rates for processing a given volume of solid waste. As a further
example, a search for software specific to community planning resulted in some
interesting user interface designs, but no actual models for our use. CommunityViz was
one package that had a very user-friendly approach to visualizing community planning
and differentiating community zoning approaches (Placeways, LLC, 2010). However,
CommunityViz did not have the level of engineering interaction needed for this project’s
needs.
4.6.6

Summary. If COTS packages were required, the selection process could

follow the suggestions of each package listed above. However, since none of the selected
packages met all of the requirements for integration, the programming for each utility
would need to be done as in in-house collaborative package. This allowed for improved
accuracy of integration of utilities within the model.
4.7

SUMMARY OF OTHER/ FUTURE WORK ON BASE CAMP MODEL
The efforts at Missouri S&T to create a virtual model of a base camp are ongoing.

As a search for commercial off the shelf models of utilities turned up no solutions of
value to the project, computational engines specific to the needs of a military base are
being created for integration into the base camp model. The basic structure of the system
has been captured in SysML. A baseline of the current utility usage has also been
developed based on data provide from the customer. A rudimentary user interface has
been developed for early-stage testing of the system. A preliminary piece has been tested
with a small user group, but more testing will occur as further integration is added.
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As a whole, the project has produced many lessons for the design group at
Missouri S&T and for the customer. Five major project management lessons learned
from the base camp work include the following:
Models need to be built specific to the requirements and real-world installations
of the represented system. Using commercial modeling software for a military installation
would not have provided an accurate view of a military-built system. Commercial utility
models are used for permanent installations and managing long-term viability. Base
camps are built with modular equipment that does not conform to American standards of
commercial or residential construction.
In order for virtual models to be accurate to the true state of nature, a great deal of
expert data is required to design and test these models. Sometimes those closest to the
information do not realize the significance of the knowledge they have and do not speak
up. Other times the data does not exist or is incomplete. The project team must be
creative in bridging gaps in ways that provide accurate results.
Management of the project team requires application of some aspects of systems
engineering as well. Subject matter experts must have experience and knowledge specific
to the system on which they are working. They also need to be sufficiently
knowledgeable in the application of systems engineering methodologies. This ensures
that they have the basis to ask the right questions of the user organization to elicit the
information most needed to the final project.
Due to the level of interaction needed with system experts, an effort of this nature
requires a great deal of buy-in from the user community. If cooperation from the
community is lacking and experts are unwilling to provide input to building the design
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and feedback from testing a preliminary model, the product will not accurately reflect the
real state of nature of the system.
To address this problem, having an advocate pushing the program from inside the
user organization is a great asset. This individual must be high enough in the user
organization and respected enough with in the informal culture to appropriately influence
the flow of communication between the project team and the user group. The base camp
has been blessed with just such an individual in Kurt Kinnevan.
As the project continues through integration, additional surveys will be conducted
to further support the hypothesis that virtual modeling tools, such as the VFOB tool,
reduce the appearance of complexity making the system easier to design and manage
from a user perspective. Other testing will occur on the integration of other major
subsytems and the final user interface.
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5

MODELING EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

In efforts to address large-scale natural and manmade emergencies, small crews of
law enforcement officers, paramedics, firefighters, and other emergency personal join
forces to minimize the impact on people, equipment, and the environment. This multiagency collaboration has been referred to by many different names; for the purposes of
this work the term Emergency Response Organizations (EROs) will be used.
The repercussions of failures within EROs often result in loss of lives, therefore
the stakes are high to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of responses. Therefore,
these organizations are an area of interest for many management and organizational
researchers. Due to the type of collaboration and the environment in which these
organizations function, they tend to exhibit behavior different from standard
organizations. In order to improve understanding of the current state of these
organizations, it is important to look at what problems have already been addressed and
the state of the current organizational architecture.
5.1

LITERATURE REVIEW OF EROS
One of the first modern emergency response architectures was an interagency task

force named the Fire Fighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential
Emergencies (FIRESCOPE), formed in the early 1970s (FIRESCOPE, n.d.). This
taskforce was created in response to disastrous and rampant wildfires in Southern
California. The task set forth for this group was to “create and implement applications in
fire service management, technology, and coordination, with an emphasis on incident
command and multi-agency coordination (FIRESCOPE, n.d.).” Four essential
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requirements needed to be met for the solution to be successful were: flexibility,
scalability, consistency, and cost effectiveness.
The result of this effort was the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS creates
what is generically referred to as a unified command. “The Unified Command… is a
system whereby no agency or function will divest their authority or responsibility on any
incident. All agencies [assigned] to the command or staff roles will share equally in the
development of overall objectives and management of the entire incident.” (Stumpf,
2001) ICS is the fundamental basis establishing a standardized response hierarchy for
multi-organizational responses.
ICS experienced success in limited field testing through the late 1970s, before
formally being adopted by the Los Angeles Fire Department in 1978. After further
success, gradual implementation by various emergency response organizations was
experienced (FIRESCOPE, 2003). ICS was adopted and/or endorsed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the National Fire Protection Association, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency,
as well as many state and local governments on an organization by organization basis
(History of ICS, 1994). ICS was becoming an unspoken standard for response
architecture.
In 1980, FIRESCOPE’s ICS program was incorporated as the backbone of a
nationwide program known as the National Interagency Incident Management System
(NIIMS). NIIMS still had a primary focus on multiagency firefighting, but allowed the
principles of ICS to be applied to a variety of scenarios from natural disasters like floods
and hurricanes to manmade events like bombings or major aircraft accidents. NIIMS
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marked the first national standardization for response architectures. NIIMS incorporated
five major subsystems as components of an effective response architecture: ICS, training,
qualifications and certifications, publication management, and supporting technology
(National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2004).
NIIMS existed as a voluntary standard across multiple disciplines of emergency
responders, remaining founded on the principle and structure of ICS. Standards for
training and for the issuing and maintaining of qualifications had not existed at this level
prior to NIIMS. The cross-functional nature of NIIMS training served as a template for
future discipline specific education. NIIMS remained the standard response architecture
for the U.S. for over twenty years, with piece-by-piece improvements, but no widespread
change. NIIMS was a standard, but it was a voluntary standard and not applied by all
response organizations. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need
for standardization of emergency response methods (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). As these
events unfolded, the highly emotional and chaotic response to this large scale emergency
showcased the weaknesses of the state of emergency response at federal and state levels.
The national and local responses to an event of this magnitude garnered a great deal of
attention, both positive and negative.
George W. Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5),
Management of Domestic Incidents, directing the development and administration of the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) in February of 2003 (Bush, 2003). On
March 1, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued NIMS to provide a
nationwide template for responsible entities to “work together to prevent, protect against,
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respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents.” (United States
Department of Homeland Security, 2008c)
NIMS revised the original NIIMS framework to allow for more flexibility in the
command, and to provide a federally approved approach to a variety of emergency
response efforts. NIMS expanded on the NIIMS subsystems. The six highlighted
subsystems of NIMS (National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2004) include:
1. Command and Management - an expansion on ICS
2. Preparedness - focused on planning, training, exercises, and qualifications
3. Resource Management - a process to describe, inventory, track, and dispatch
resources before, during, and after an incident
4. Communications and Information Management - a standardized framework
for communications and information management
5. Supporting Technologies - Technology and technological systems including
specialized technologies that facilitate ongoing operations and incident
management activities in situations that call for unique technology-based
capabilities.
6. Ongoing Management and Maintenance - provide strategic direction for
continuous refinement of the system over the long term.
As implemented, NIMS is the first time communications has been called out as an
essential element in and of itself. Prior to NIMS, communications was wrapped up within
the architecture and not stressed as a key integration component.
NIMS was tested by multiple large-scale responses in its first few years of
existence. Perhaps the largest and most publicized response was that involving the
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Hurricane Seasons of 2004 and 2005. The response to assist the City of New Orleans,
Louisiana, during and after Hurricane Katrina made national headlines. However, Katrina
did not affect just the city of New Orleans.
William Carwile was appointed as the Federal Coordinating Officer responding to
Hurricane Katrina for the state of Mississippi. Carwile gives us his perspective and
experiences in a paper he published in Homeland Security Affairs in 2005. He begins by
establishing his role in the response: “The FCO has no authority to direct the state
response, but does provide technical assistance, and expertise, and is authorized by the
Stafford Act to mission-assign federal agencies, with or without reimbursement, to
support the requests of the governor and his/her representatives.” (Carwile, 2005) This
implied that Carwile served as the federal lead to the response process, with the authority
to call in and coordinate the response of various federal agencies for assistance. With
multiple hurricane responses under his belt, including the 2004 hurricane season in
Florida, Carwile is knowledgeable in the field he speaks about for this article. Carwile
provides some experiential insight to the depth and breadth of the Unified Command
concept as written and executed by various doctrines. For example, according to ICS as
developed and implemented by FIRESCOPE in the 1970s, a Unified Command exists
only at the top levels of the response. Independent organizations still manage their own
responses, retain the responsibility and control of their resources, but work in
coordination with other similarly independent organizations to accomplish the same set
of objectives. This can cause issues when two simultaneous response organizations go
about accomplishing the same task, but with conflicting methodologies. Carwile states
that “‘Pure’ ICS may work well for fires and smaller disasters, but some substantial
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modifications are required for large scale events.” (Carwile, 2005) “Pure” ICS addresses
the “What” of a response by emphasizing the need for common goals and targets.
Carwile targets a lack of communication about the “How” of a response as being an
essential weakness.
Carwile also noted an added level of complexity to be considered when ICS
involves multiple jurisdictions. “In some states, the state constitution gives considerable
authority to local jurisdictions; this can make things a bit murky when attempting to
establish hierarchical arrangements in a unified command.” (Carwile, 2005) Not only do
the rules and regulations applicable to different organizations vary by location, but the
terminology, roles, responsibilities, and authorities assigned to hierarchical roles within
one individual organization can be drastically different from a second responding
organization. NIMS had addressed this gap at the highest level by standardizing the titles
and hierarchy of the unified command structure, but nothing addressed the conflicts at the
working level.
Carwile’s experiences are representative of other lessons learned from the Katrina
and Rita responses. After such widespread consensus on the existence of substantial holes
in the existing standard architecture, a revision was published in 2008 by the Department
of Homeland Security. After the NIMS architecture was put through the ringer by gulfcoast hurricanes in 2004 and 2005, a series of lessons learned were collected and
incorporated into a newly revised standard response architecture. The National Response
Framework ( a.k.a. Framework) published in 2008 (United States Department of
Homeland Security, 2008e) has been designed for easier facilitation of large-scale multiorganizational responses.
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“The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a
systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all
levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private
sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size,
location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property
and harm to the environment. NIMS works hand in hand with the National
Response Framework (NRF). NIMS provides the template for the
management of incidents, while the NRF provides the structure and
mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management.” (United
States Department of Homeland Security, 2008d)

The Framework is the overarching operational guide to responses to hazards of
any kind in the United States of America. The Framework builds upon the NIMS
template, using key lessons learned from wide-spread national catastrophes including
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. When revising the standard for emergency response
architecture, the authors took into consideration feedback from after action reports
(AARs) filed after actual emergencies of various sizes and severities, and from
preparedness drills and exercises used as training for response personnel. This resulted in
a new name that more accurately portrayed the intent of the architecture, and broader
scope with a wider audience (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2008e).
Also key to this revision was the expanded focus on partnerships and multiorganizational responses. As noted by Carwile (2005), organizations within different
jurisdictions implement differing levels of responsibility and authority to their individual
hierarchical structures. Organizations use different terminology and are trained to
respond in different ways to the same stimuli. The Framework reaffirms that the primary
responsibility for the safety and security of citizens within any jurisdiction belongs to the
local communities, tribes, and states. It attempts to address the need for multi-
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organization cooperation by including clearer terminology with refined roles and
responsibilities for federal response positions. Another key element of the Framework
was the addition of “Guides for Response Partners.” These new guides were instituted to
help local and state responders, as well as non-government organizations, integrate the
core principles and terminology, roles and responsibilities, and procedures for requests
for assistance into the planning and preparedness documents for their individual response
organizations. The goal of this effort is to provide a unified, coordinated, and effective
national response. However, it should be noted that the Framework is still mandated only
at the federal level. It is suggested for these smaller organizations, but not required.
A final alteration in the Framework was in major annex changes. This included 12
new or significantly revised sub-documents. One major addition is the development of a
Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR) Support Annex. This provides responses to
emergencies pertaining to loss of communications and infrastructure.
5.2

COMMUNICATION WEAKNESSES IN EROS
After over 40 years of development, the EROs are still experiencing dramatic

malfunctions and constant revisions to address weaknesses. As with any system, the
greater the complexity, the more likely there will be complications. There is no question
that the standard emergency response architecture is a complex system, meeting all eight
of Ciller’s qualities for a Complex Adaptive System (1998). Further review was
performed to determine areas of significant problems.
After real events and any of the training events, responders are surveyed, as an
organization and as individuals, for any identified flaws and weaknesses of the response
procedures and/or individual responses that vary from procedure. These AARs are used
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to improve the emergency operating procedures of that organization. Due to the
sensitivity of subject matter and risks of exposing organizational weaknesses, most of the
AARs remain within each organization. There are opportunities for these AARs to be
shared across organizations; however, they are required to be sanitized to a point that
they lose much of the relevant information. As a result the lessons learned are either
caught in an internal silo or diluted to a point of little utility.
In an attempt to encourage information sharing between organizations, the US
Department of Homeland Security has established a lessons learned data base for sharing
AARs. The information available is highly sanitized, but still allows for some key
problems to be noted. While there are many areas where recurrent failures could occur,
one area was chosen that could have substantial impact to the emergency response
community: communications.
5.2.1

Communications in Emergencies. When the links between the

components of any system breakdown, the system efficiency decreases and the system
could fail altogether. This is the case with communications during an emergency
response. The leading cause of many of these breakdowns in emergency response is a
lack of unambiguous consistent communication, both between and within organizations.
The ability to communicate emergent information is essential to a unified
command structure such as that proposed by the Framework. The best case scenario is to
rely upon face-to-face communication when at all possible. A unified command post,
appropriately equipped, securely located, and with the high-ranking officers from each of
the responding organizations represented provides the ultimate situation for
communication and joint information sharing. Though this is a preferable set-up, it is not

60

common. Many factors contribute to a more physically distributed command, including
availability of space and resources, as well as a tendency of organizations to prefer to
work in isolation during instability.
5.2.1.1 How communication is addressed by the Framework. The Framework
includes two appendices that address Communications Infrastructure. The ESF#2 –
Communications Annex provides the authorities, roles, responsibilities, and actions to reestablish communications infrastructure after a disaster strikes (United States Department
of Homeland Security, 2008a). Coordination responsibilities of this piece are assigned to
the Department of Homeland Security’s National Communications System, while calling
out the National Cyber Security Division for close coordination in cyber incidents.
Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR) Support Annex (United States
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), focuses on incidents that result in the loss of
Federally Identified Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources. Specifically, the focus is
on (a) situational awareness, (b) impact assessments and analysis (c) information sharing,
and (d) requests for assistance or information from private-sector CIKR owners and
operators. The CIKR Support Annex designates specific federal departments and
agencies as responsible for the oversight of CIKR areas.
As with the previous ESF, the CIKR Support Annex does not apply to
communications used during a response. These documents target responses to
emergencies pertaining to loss of communications and infrastructure, like the massive
widespread power outage that affected the Northeast U.S. and Ontario, Canada in August
of 2003. What is needed is a method to address communications failure during an event.
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5.2.1.2 How communications fail. In most cases, the responding organizations
will use radio communication as default during a response. This technology does not rely
on the physical infrastructure that is most likely to fail (ie. power, telephone, and
Internet) in times of crisis-level disasters. It has been established in past disasters that, in
most cases, the existing radio infrastructure is not sufficient for large scale, multiorganizational responses. Reception can be blocked by traffic or by physical barriers.
Giving a radio to an ambulance driver is wonderful in theory. However, if the radio
signal cannot reach the hospital for the last 10 minutes of the commute, there is still a
critical communication breakdown preventing essential information from reaching
responders at the point where they need it the most. Due to resource availability and/or
security issues, command centers in the past have been located in areas where there was
no radio reception. Responders had to step outside of the facility to send and receive
communications (Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2006).
During multi-organizational responses, frequencies for internal communications
and external communications can become overlapped by separate organizations. This
results in channels becoming crowded, high-priority messages not being understood, and
sometimes low-priority messages being assigned higher importance due to a
misunderstood phrase or sheer repetition.
For example, if a sizeable earthquake hits the New Madrid fault in southern
Missouri, there would be multiple response organizations from different jurisdictions
involved in the response. It would be advantageous for there to be a cross-walk executed
ahead of time to map the technical communications resources available to Missouri
responders with the Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Illinois responders. Each
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responding organization could be assigned a set of frequencies for their internal uses. A
set of frequencies for external communications (to the incident command post, to
dispatchers, and to the various emergency operations centers) could be established ahead
of time and programmed in to the radios for increased speed and usability.
Northern Illinois University (NIU) gives us an example where preplanning for
communication between organizations has succeeded. After the Columbine High School
incident in 1999, NIU worked with state and local agencies to establish and maintain a
standard for interoperable communications. This teamwork resulted in the NIU police
officers, on-scene at a campus shooting, being able to transmit critical information to
emergency medical services personnel (Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2011).
Another primary issue with communication between emergency response
personnel is the varied vernacular employed by different response agencies. Some
organizations use identical terms to communicate contradictory messages. As an
example, the term “man-down” has multiple meanings to emergency responders (Lessons
Learned Information Sharing). To a group of law enforcement officers, man-down means
a member of their organization has been shot or otherwise removed from action. A mine
rescue team can use “man down” to refer to any situation when a worker is below the
surface. To paramedics, “man down” indicates a response is needed to an unknown
situation. Some organizations use internally standardized 10 codes, while other
organizations have never been trained on those codes and use a distinctive set of key
words instead. It has been suggested that a singular set of response jargon be developed
and used across disciplines, however this has not been addressed at the national level.
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Interagency planning is something stressed within the Framework. This would
assist in not only standardizing the technology for communication, but also some of the
terminology and roles and responsibilities that become cloudy during a multiorganizational response. However, it will only work if all sides are in cooperation.
Adaptation of the Framework is suggested for all responders, but only mandatory at the
federal level. A secondary problem with this solution is that there are no boundaries
between what is considered “interagency.” This raises a lot of questions about response
coordination. If your organization is capable and willing to respond to incidents in two
different jurisdictions, should your response efforts change to meet the standard
technology and terminology of the “local” responders? If so, does this restrict to whom
you will respond? Will you respond to the municipality to your north, who follows very
similar standards to your own, but not to the town to your south because they use a
different set of standards? Where do the standards start taking precedence over helping
save lives?
5.2.2

Humans as Responders. When considering problems with failed

communications during emergency response, more than just setting standards needs to be
considered. At the heart of communications failures is the fact that responders are human.
The most common solution to any human-centered problem is training. Equally important
and less examined are the areas of human system integration and human centered design.
Humans require training and exposure to excel in high-stress environments. Many
responders will train constantly on their technical response pieces, even as far as
emergency response exercises. While this refines many of the localized actions necessary
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to address an emergency, most of this training does not adequately prepare the responders
to communicate in emotional, adrenaline-pumped, high-stress scenarios.
Emergency medical technicians, for example, are trained in depth on how to
provide cardio-pulmonary respiration, how to field dress a wound, and how to properly
support a back injury while transporting the victim to a medical center. These are
response actions they use every day; these responses are at the level of unconscious
competence. They are trained on how to operate their communications equipment within
the realms of their “normal” responses, but they are not trained on how those
communications might need to change in a large-scale emergency. This contributes to the
overload on the radio.
Enhanced training for all responders is needed to instruct them on how and when
to alter standard procedures, how to change radio frequencies, and how to prioritize radio
transmissions. With a plan for conducting this training available, the solution lies in
choosing the right people for the job, and giving those individuals as much exposure and
experience as is financially feasible. Various training methods require different levels of
resources, and a different type of learning experience. Common training methods include:


in-house exercises;



multi-organization exercises in the field;



tabletop drills, where a scenario is addressed by talking through the response
step by step;



classroom training;



hands on training; and



actual responses.
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Each of these methods increases an individual responder’s familiarity and
expertise with response actions. Increased exposure reduces the level of emotional
response and allows for a higher level of accuracy and comfort with response actions.
5.3

EROS AS SOCIOTECHNICAL COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
EROs are traditionally not among the areas addressed by systems engineering.

EROs are composed of people reliant on technology to perform their jobs, which makes
EROs sociotechnical systems. A large-scale emergency response is a joint effort between
multiple organizations, which adds to the complexity. An ERO is a CAS, and as such
could be improved by applying standard systems engineering techniques. EROs meet all
eight points of qualification for a CAS.


SIZE – While ever response is different, large scale multi-agency responses are
far beyond the scope of a traditional system design.



INTERACTIONS – Multi-agency responses are integrated on many levels. These
points of integration can range from radio frequencies, joint chains of command,
or shared physical resources.



CASCADING – Actions of one sub-organization/subsystem of an ERO have
direct effects on the actions of other responders.



REBOUND: When a change is made to one system, effects are triggered through
surrounding systems that can cause the single change to reflect back on to the
same subsystem, thus triggering another round of downstream effects.



OPEN: EROs are open systems, constantly interacting with their environment.



ENDOTHERMIC: EROs are resource intensive. A consistent flow of water, fuel,
manpower, and money is essential.
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EVOLVING: An individual emergency response occurs in stages, one flowing
into the next. The responding organization is also evolving, with new
technologies, restrictions, and requirements constantly being added to the system.



ISOLATION: ERO sub-organizations have a tendency to work in isolation, and
interact only with their immediate surroundings, resulting in a stovepipe of
information.

These and other similarities between EROs and military base camps allow us to predict
that some of the same methods and tools that are being used successfully on modeling the
base camp might be used to manage some of the problems caused by the complex nature
of EROs.
5.4

EXAMPLE OF SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM DESIGN FOR EROS
Based on limited experiential data of a multi-agency emergency response, an

example was composed of what a flow diagram might possibly look like for a small wildfire. Figure 5.1 shows the two segments of a response: the field responders (above the
dotted line) and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and reserve resources (below
the line). The information between the EOC and the Incident Commander (IC) is well
outlined byfederal guidelines, as is the information between the field responding units
and the IC. However, the information sharing between the individual response units, as
well as the information between the EOC and the reserve units, are less well understood,
and therefore designated as unknowns in this diagram.
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The goal of this type of application is to move as many of the unknowns into known
territory as possible. The information can be improved by bringing in subject matter
experts, or by further development of guidelines and training to ensure that the
information being shared between responders is a) clear b) concise and c) consistent.
5.5

DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF COMPLEXITY WITHIN EROS
The nature of a multi-agency emergency response will require a flexible approach

to complexity. The number and type of responders are going to change based on the type
of emergency to which they are responding. The organizations responding to a large
wildfire are going to be potentially different than the organizations responding to a manmade disaster. Each response is unique, so the model will be required to be highly
flexible and somewhat generic in nature. Treating Fire Station A like Fire Station B will
induce some disparity between the model and reality, but it will improve the ability for
initial modeling to be completed. In this example, one subject matter expert could be
consulted on the communications needs of a fire station in their response efforts,
providing input into the model. A working model could then provide training back to
both Fire Stations A and B to make their response behaviors more closely correlated to
the model.
As seen in Figure 5.2, the intent is not to lessen the number of interactions, but to
improve the knowledge about and therefore the quality of those interactions.
Understanding the current state of interactions between organizations will improve the
ability to address the issues with technology, training, and the terminology used by the
organizations. The two plotted points are for demonstration purposes only, not from data
analysis.
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5.6

FUTURE WORK MODELING EROS
There were three major weaknesses identified in the earlier discussion on

emergency communications: training, technology, and terminology. The overarching
architecture and the three identified areas of weakness could potentially be addressed by
application of systems theory techniques and/or complex adaptive systems management
methodologies.
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The ICS, which is the backbone of the ERO’s architecture, should be expressed
using SysML (Systems Modeling Language) to describe the ERO structure, incorporating
specialized subclass generalizations and stereotypes in MBSE. This would help to
introduce some much needed uniformity and could make it possible to have some level of
common ground at a high level of abstraction. This architecting could then be shared with
and evaluated by users to help achieve consistency in response management.
Research is active in pursuit of improvements to the specific technologies used by
responders. However, the work is mostly focused on improving the modularity and
mobility of replacements when the existing technology fails. Other gaps in the
technological arena can be addressed through using MBSE to map the current capabilities
of signal transmission and reception, of any and all technologies, whether radio, phone,
or satellite. Modeling the communications capabilities of high risk areas as a preparatory
measure before an emergency could allow for faster more efficient response actions after
an outage. This could ensure that incident command posts are located in an area best
suited for sending and receiving data. Additional integrated solvers can be included to
map out radio and cell towers to reroute reception when one area of a grid is unavailable
or overloaded, allowing responders in low signal areas to still be heard.
Training could also be improved by using virtual models. The ability to create
realistic virtual training scenarios focused on the required communication skills of all
responders, regardless of occupation, could ensure consistent distribution of essential
knowledge when new standards are developed and dispersed. This would also allow for
standardization of record keeping and training-based certifications. This type of training
system can be made simple and uniform, as to apply to any size of responding
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organization, from the volunteer firefighters in rural communities to the presidentially
appointed federal coordinating officers on large scale emergencies.
Terminology is an area that is often overlooked in after-action scenarios, and
therefore lacking in attention to the weaknesses. Recommendations for future work in
this area include a look at using model based systems engineering to approach the
breakdown in communications due to terminology. Work is currently being conducted
using MBSE to address ontological differences in various technological fields. This
approach shows potential as a method of bringing resolution to the lack of a single
standard language for use by emergency responders.
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6

CONCLUSIONS

An evaluation of literature relating to sociotechnical systems found a gap in the
research regarding techniques used to manage the complex nature of these systems.
Recognizing a sociotechnical system as a complex adaptive system suggested application
of a model based systems engineering approach that is commonly applied to technical
complex adaptive systems. Work toward this new application for sociotechnical systems
included analysis of an ongoing project, the Virtual Forward Operating Base project
funded by the United States Department of Defense. A two-factor complexity evaluation
tool was developed for early analysis of the level of complexity in a given system. This
scale uses perception of the number of unknowns and the degree of integration in a given
system to help determine whether or not the application of a virtual model is appropriate.
The same tool was also used to evaluate the perceived level of complexity within the
virtual model by a user group. The results of the data analysis supported the hypothesis
that a virtual model decreases the perception of complexity by the end user. The
difference between the results provided by the systems experts designing the model and
those taken from a sample of end-users was statistically significant. While the expert
rated the system in the complex region on the two-factor scale, the sample of end-users
rated a base camp in the complicated area, indicating a lower level of complexity.
Future work on this effort is required to validate assumptions tying the twofactors used in this test to the eight qualities of a complex adaptive system identified by
Cilliers (1998). This will likely involve development of a multi-dimensional approach to
address each of the eight qualities, and then testing against the two-factor model for
validation of the simplified tool.
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The two-factor survey should also be retested against a second user sample. A
duelsurvey approach is proposed wherein the first survey will be given before the usergroup is introduced to the tool, as a baseline for evaluation. The second survey will be
taken later in the project, after the modeling tool is demonstrated and put to use for
hands-on modeling of base camps. This second data set is proposed for application to the
2012-2013 Captain’s Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood.
A third area of future work is to test the big picture hypothesis (virtual modeling
reduces the perception of complexity and improves understanding of a system) against a
different socio-technical system. One system identified for this second test is an
emergency response organization (ERO). An ERO can be defined as a sociotechnical
complex adaptive system, and meets preliminary estimates of applicability through using
the two-factor complexity evaluation tool.
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